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A STURDY ROGUE 
BRUCE K. MILLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the reign of Elizabeth P David Oakley would have been 
classified by the law as "a sturdy rogue," or perhaps, "an idle vaga-
bond,"2 and these labels would have fixed Oakley to his social sta-
tion as assuredly as the "welfare queen"3 label defines the place of 
poor, unmarried, unemployed mothers today. Rogues and 
vagabonds in sixteenth century England were hardly neutral social 
types. The words themselves, connoting an insouciant, almost 
smirking, violation of good social order, conveyed an attitude of 
defiance of work norms that if allowed to spread unchecked might 
spawn rebellion among the male members of the laboring classes. 
The Crown and Parliament's fear of the deviant behavior of 
rogues and vagabonds prompted them to adopt the earliest mea-
sures in our legal history to classify and stigmatize by statute such 
behavior.4 These measures, not at all coincidentally, included the 
precursors of the parental support statute that brought Oakley to 
the attention of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.s Additionally, that 
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Review for 2002-03 and 2003-04, and especially Articles Editors Jim Strub and Mike 
Fellows, for suggesting a symposium on the Oakley decision and for tenaciously seeing 
it through to completion. Thanks also to participants in faculty fora at Drake and West-
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league Eric Miller for interesting conversations about law's paternalism, and to Meghan 
Freed Pelletier, Managing Editor, and her able staff, for expert and understanding edi-
torial assistance. 
1. Queen Elizabeth (Tudor) I of England (r. 1558-1603). 
2. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR 24 (Joel F. Handler, 
ed., Greenwood Publishing Co. 1964). 
3. President Reagan often told the story of the fictitious "Cadillac welfare queen" 
who used numerous aliases, addresses and Social Security cards to milk the system for 
over $150,000. See The Mendacity Index, WASH. MONTHLY (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.comlfeatures/2003/0309.mendacity-index.html (last vis-
ited July 1, 2004). 
4. See Elizabethan Poor Laws, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601) (Eng.). 
5. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001). The statute Oakley vio-
lated was WIS. STAT. § 948.22(2) (1997-98), which makes it a felony to fail to pay child 
support for 120 or more consecutive days. [d. 
109 
110 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:109 
court's decision to sanction Oakley's violation of his support obliga-
tions by impeding his right to father additional children6 also has its 
roots in the Elizabethans' vain efforts to eradicate the sturdy rogue 
from English society. 
I. PARENTAL SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS AND ELIZABETHAN POOR 
RELIEF: ORIGINS OF A DUAL SYSTEM 
In a series of articles originally prepared for the Stanford Law 
Review almost forty years ago, the noted equal protection scholar 
Jacobus tenBroek described the regulation of vagrancy and vaga-
bondage under the relief laws of the Tudor monarchs, regulation 
which anticipates contemporary federal and state statutes that mon-
itor the behavior of the poor as a condition for their receipt of pub-
lic aid: 
Idleness was thought to be the result of personal choice rather 
than economic conditions. Based on personal fault it was person-
ally correctable if only the will were instilled. Accordingly the 
Tudors, like their predecessors, unleashed the furies of the crimi-
nallaw against combined idleness and poverty. 'Ruffelers, sturdy 
vagabonds, and valiant beggars' were to be seized, tied naked to 
the end of a cart and whipped through the nearest market town 
until bloody, and then returned to the places where they were 
born or last dwelt, each there to 'put hymselfe to laboure lyke as 
a trewe man oweth to do.' That no work was to be found in that 
place did not matter. If 'loitering, wandering and idleness or vag-
abondage' continued, the punishment was repeated, successively 
augmented by having the upper gristle of the right ear 'clean cut 
away' and eventually by death. Other penalties added from time 
to time were slavery for two years and then for life, assignment to 
the galleys, and banishment from the realm? 
Professor tenBroek reports that these violent penalties failed. 8 
The Tudor Monarchy and the Parliament realized, not surprisingly, 
that it was far easier to eliminate the legal identity of an undesirable 
class of persons by statute than to change the behavior of the 
human beings who constituted the offending category. Upon this 
realization they tried a different approach, the forerunner of the 
workhouse and, eventually, the poorhouse and poor farm of the 
6. Id. at 201-02. 
7. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
8. Id. at 24. 
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American nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Again, Profes-
sor tenBroek: 
The alternative eventually adopted was the institution whose 
name characterized its function, the house of correction. There 
the 'sturdy rogue' could be starved, worked, punished and 
thereby reformed. . .. [Lord] Coke thought the proper working 
of the poor law depended on the houses of correction. When 
justices of the peace diligently performed their duty in this re-
spect 'there was not a Rogue to be seen in any part of England, 
but when Justices ... became ... trepidi, Rogues ... swarmed 
againe.'9 
The laws of the Tudors were thus absolute in their condemna-
tion of idleness among the able-bodied as a character flaw and ve-
hement in their zeal to correct it. And yet, the link between mere 
sloth and the "thefts, murders, haynous offences and great enorrni-
ties"l0 thought to follow from it may now seem overdrawn, or even 
fanciful. How could the specter of "sturdy rogues" swarming the 
English countryside trigger the fear and hatred conveyed by Lord 
Coke's admonition to the judges? 
The answer lay in no small part in a progressive reform ef-
fected by the Tudor monarchs and known to us as the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws. These laws, enacted piecemeal by Parliament through 
the sixteenth century, were consolidated by Statute of 43 Elizabeth, 
enacted in 1601.11 The 1601 statute provided directly and, as it has 
turned out in England and America, permanently, for the relief of 
the poor from the public treasury.12 Relief was provided not only 
to "impotent" poor people, those not viewed as employable, but 
also, significantly, to able-bodied adults who were unemployed.13 
Professor tenBroek credits the Statute of 1601 with having accom-
plished "the firm establishment of the principle of public responsi-
bility to maintain the destitute."14 This he counts as a "great 
achievement,"15 and so it was. However, with the principle of pub-
lic responsibility to maintain the poor came its corollary, public re-
sponsibility to improve their character. This equally essential 
responsibility could only be discharged by making certain, by any 
9. [d. 
10. [d. (quoting 22 Hen. 8, c. 12 (1530) (Eng.». 
11. Elizabethan Poor Laws, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601) (Eng.). 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 9. 
15. [d. 
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and all necessary means, that the able-bodied poor lived their lives 
properly. 
The Poor Laws sought to supervise the lives of the able-bodied 
but destitute in two basic ways, both shaped by the sobering image 
of the sturdy rogue. The first control measure was the work re-
quirement, a condition on the receipt of public aid which remains a 
central feature of welfare law and policy to this day. TenBroek re-
ports that, from the beginning, the Tudor relief statutes directed lo-
cal officials to insist that those with "lymmes stronge ynough to 
labour be kept in contynuallabour,''16 either for private masters or 
in sheltered, publicly operated projects. An able-bodied person 
who refused such work was sent to the house of correction, "there 
to be straightlye kept, as well in Diet as in Worke, and also pun-
ished from tyme to tyme."17 In this way, the state could sustain the 
destitute, and at the same time deter requests for aid, thereby mini-
mizing expenditures, and reform the character of "the miscreant 
idler"18 with the temerity to seek it. 
The second control measure was a consequence of the Poor 
Laws' assumption of direct responsibility for the care of poor chil-
dren. In the case of children too young to be indentured or appren-
ticed, forced labor offered neither the possibility of character 
reform nor the opportunity to reduce the costs of support which 
were seen then, as now, as a threat to fiscal probity. The solution 
fashioned by Parliament and the Crown was to establish a distinct 
system of family law for the poor, the central feature of which was 
the imposition of legal liability of parents for the support of their 
children. Hence, the Poor Law of 43 Elizabeth, which provided, 
inter alia, that: 
the parents ... of everie poore ... person not able to worke, 
beinge of a sufficient abilitie, shall at their owne Chardges releive 
and maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and ac-
cordinge to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace of that Coun-
tie where suche sufficient persons dwell ... shalbe assessed; upon 
paine that everie one of them shall forfeite twenty shillings for 
everie monthe which they shall faile therein.19 
This statute marks the origin, in English law, of a sanction able 
parental obligation to provide for the material sustenance of chil-
16. Id. at 23 (quoting 27 Hen. 8, c. 25 (1535) (Eng.)). 
17. Id. (quoting 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3, § IV (1575-1576) (Eng.)). 
18. Id. at 25. 
19. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, § VI (1601) (Eng.). 
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dren.20 Though such an obligation is now both commonplace in 
common law jurisdictions, and extended, at least formally, to par-
ents of all children, not just poor ones, it was nevertheless a radical 
departure from the settled law of families in 1601. Family obliga-
tions in Elizabethan common law remained feudal, which meant 
that they were rooted in property, rather than personal, relation-
ships. Thus, as Professor tenBroek describes, "feudal law did not 
recognize the family as such or assign rights and duties to its mem-
bers by virtue of membership. Property rights were the only privi-
leges which the king's courts would enforce between father and son 
and between husband and wife."21 Though tenBroek does not re-
mark upon their absence, mothers and daughters were accorded no 
legal recognition whatsoever in feudal property law. 
Save for the rights of eldest sons as heirs to receive their inheri-
tances, feudal property relations recognized no legally enforceable 
claims children could make against their parents.22 Instead, fathers 
held legal claims to the service in labor of their children without any 
countervailing obligation to pay wages or to otherwise provide for 
their material support.23 Children could remain in their father's 
household only at the "complete sufferance of the father," who 
could turn any child out as he saw fit.24 Against this background, 
the imposition of support obligations on the parents of poor chil-
dren was remarkable, and justifiable only because it was these poor 
children, and only these, who would otherwise make claims against 
the public coffers.25 
These same fiscal concerns animated the first significant 
amendment to the 1601 law of parental responsibility for poor chil-
dren. The amendment directly linked this responsibility to the 
work requirement on which the parents' own eligibility for aid de-
pended. A 1609 statute described the problem it proposed to solve 
as follows: 
Many willful people, fynding that they having Children, have 
some hope to have Reliefe from the Parish wherein they dwell, 
and being able to Labor, and therebie to releive themselves and 
their Famylyes, doe nevertheless rune awaie out of their Parishes 
20. TENBROOK, supra note 2, at 30. 
21. [d. at 34. 
22. [d. at 35. 
23. [d: 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 37. 
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and leave their Famylyes upon the Parish.26 
The statute's solution to this problem, not surprisingly, was to 
inflict upon these willful people the "paines endured by" that arch-
enemy of good social order, "the sturdy rogue": commitment to the 
house of correction for reform through forced labor, punishment, 
and, if necessary, starvation.27 Once again, destitute children could 
be sustained, but only if their parents were not deterred by the 
terms of rehabilitation made a condition for such sustenance. 
Placing the origin of parental support obligations in the law of 
welfare rather than that of families has more than historical signifi-
cance. The Elizabethans' stark divide between the duties of poor 
parents and those whose material circumstances assured their inde-
pendence from the system of public aid continues to govern the ad-
ministration, if not the formal design, of support obligations today. 
TenBroek's articles go on to contrast the facial expansion in Ameri-
can jurisdictions of the legal duty to support children to all parents 
with the continuing practice of enforcing that duty only against par-
ents who endure the misfortune of seeking public assistance for 
themselves or for their children.28 Focusing primarily on his home 
state of California, tenBroek labels the consequence of this contrast 
a "dual system" of family law analogous to the racially dual system 
of public education enforced de jure by the Jim Crow regimes of the 
South and de facto by slightly less formal policies and practices in 
the rest of the country.29 
The examples of this de facto dual system marshaled by ten-
Broek are legion, too many and varied to be listed in this brief es-
say. But one measure may serve to symbolize the basic approach. 
Beginning in 1952, and extending uninterrupted through the pre-
sent time, federal welfare law has required public assistance offices 
operated by city and county governments to inform the chief law 
enforcement official for their respective jurisdictions that public aid 
has been granted to a child who has been deserted or abandoned by 
a parent.3D With the attention of district attorneys thus focused ex-
clusively on absconding parents of poor children, it is no surprise 
that the limited prosecutorial resources available for enforcement 
of nominally universal child support obligations are allocated ac-
26. 7 Jac. 1, c. 4, § VIII (1609-1610) (Eng.). 
27. Id. 
28. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at chs. 3-4. 
29. Id. at c. 4-5. 
30. See Notice to Law Enforcement Officials (NOLEO amendments), 42 U.S.c. 
§ 602(a)(1O) (as amended) (2004). 
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cordingly. The Federal Welfare Reform Act of 199631 requires local 
prosecutors to pursue non-supporting parents of children who seek 
public assistance and directs the cooperation in such pursuit from 
jurisdictions into which non-supporting parents might wander or 
flee. This requirement virtually assures that public child support 
enforcement efforts will focus exclusively on poor parents. The leg-
islative history of the 1996 Act makes the link between parental 
support obligations and welfare explicit: 
"[o]ne of the most important provisions in this bill is the empha-
sis on the collection of child support .... By taking a tougher 
stand to establish and then enforce child support orders, some of 
the families currently tied to the welfare system may be able to 
get loose."32 Since most of these non-supporting absent parents 
are fathers, it is fair to say the goal of corralling the sturdy rogue 
remains a pillar of public welfare policy even in the twenty-first 
century. 
II. DAVID OAKLEY AS A MODERN-DAY STURDY ROGUE 
Though this history may not fully explain David Oakley's 
emergence onto the legal stage in the Wisconsin of the late 1990s, it 
does offer a context both for understanding his fate and assessing 
the rhetoric with which that fate is meted out by the narrow major-
ity of the Wisconsin Supreme CourP3 David Oakley is, of course, 
the archetype of the sturdy rogue and idle vagabond. By age thirty-
four, he fathered nine children by four different women.34 Though 
to all appearances he is good physical health, by the time of his 
prosecution for refusing to support his children, his connection to 
the respectable world of wage employment is so attenuated that not 
one of the legal actors who determined his treatment believes that 
he will ever be able to support these children, regardless of his will-
ingness to try.35 Still, there is no doubt that Oakley, to borrow the 
terms of English statutory law of 1609, is "able to labor," and has 
"run awaie" from his obligation to "releive [himself and his] fam-
ily," a shirking of duty deemed unquestionably "willful." Though 
31. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, PUb. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C). 
32. 142 CONGo REc. S9387 (1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen). 
33. See State V. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (4-3 decision). 
34. Id. at 202. 
35. Id. at 207 n.21, 212-13 n.30, 216 (Bradley, J. dissenting), 217-18 n.1 (Bradley, 
J., dissenting) & 221-22 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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the case record does not reveal whether Oakley left his children 
"upon the parish" as welfare recipients, the social problem his mis-
conduct symbolizes for the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority is 
emphatically the same one that motivated the Elizabethans: the ec-
onomic dependency of poor children. 
Justice Wilcox's opinion for the court makes clear that poor 
children are society's chief, if not exclusive, concern in imposing 
and enforcing parental support obligations: 
The effects of the nonpayment of child support on our children 
are particularly troubling. In addition to engendering long-term 
consequences such as poor health, behavioral problems, delin-
quency and low educational attainment, inadequate child support 
is a direct contributor to childhood poverty. And childhood pov-
erty is all too pervasive in our society. Over 12 million or about 
one out of every six children in our country lives in poverty. In 
Wisconsin, poverty strikes approximately 200,000 of our children 
with 437,000 at or below 200% of the poverty level in 1999. Al-
though payment of child support alone may not end childhood 
poverty, it could reduce current levels and raise childhood stan-
dards of living. Child support-when paid-on average amounts 
to over one-quarter of a poor child's family income. There is lit-
tle doubt that the payment of child support benefits poverty-
stricken children the most. Enforcing child support orders thus 
has surfaced as a major policy directive in our society.36 
Justice Bablitch's concurring opinion is equally emphatic that 
Oakley's shortcomings, like those of the rogues of old, are failings 
of character, not of circumstance: "Here is a man who has shown 
himself time and again to be totally and completely irresponsible. 
He lives only for himself and the moment, with no regard for the 
consequences of his actions and taking no responsibility for 
them."37 
Plainly Oakley's deficient character is in need of reform, or as 
we euphemistically put it today, rehabilitation. And, indeed, Justice 
Wilcox points to the salutary rehabilitative impact on Oakley of 
sanctioning his refusal to support his children in part by forbidding 
him from fathering additional ones: 
Moreover, the condition is reasonably related to the goal of reha-
bilitation ... Oakley was convicted of intentionally refusing to 
support his children .... As the state argues, the condition essen-
36. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). 
37. Id. at 214-15 (Bablitch, J., concurring). 
2004] A STURDY ROGUE 
tially bans Oakley from violating the law again. Future violations 
of the law would be detrimental to Oakley's rehabilitation, which 
necessitates preventing him from continuing to disregard its 
dictates.38 
117 
As was the case four hundred years ago, the punishment of 
sturdy rogues is, we still now tell ourselves, for their own good. 
What has changed is the form the punishment takes. Thus, we no 
longer starve non-supporting parents in houses of correction, 
though we are still prepared, as the Oakley case shows, to keep 
them there for a while.39 Nor are we tempted to abuse these mis-
creants physically or to threaten "banishment from the realm." 
Rather, we deprive them of basic freedoms enjoyed by the rest of 
us and s~bject them, as Justice Bablitch's concurrence illustrates, to 
the public humiliation of character assassination by judicial 
opinion.40 
III. PARENTAL SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS AND THE IRON LAW 
OF WELFARE 
What has not changed, however, is the real audience for the 
abasement of parents who shirk their duty to keep their children 
from becoming charges of the state. TenBroek reminds us of the 
enduring and intimate relationship in western societies between so-
cial welfare policy and the more general regulation of the terms and 
conditions under which employment is offered to poor wage 
earners: 
Any welfare system primarily operates upon and is for the bene-
fit of the working classes of the nation, and must be regarded, in 
modern times, no less than in the middle ages, as an indispensa-
ble part of the overall system of labor legislation. Whatever 
might be said in welfare terms of the necessity to deal with the 
particular needs of individuals and families, the unemployed seg-
ment of the population stands in an economic and social relation-
ship to the employed segment. How the state regulates that 
relationship, through what machinery and for what ends ... [is 
an] intricate problem of politics and economics no less than of 
welfare.41 
38. [d. at 213. 
39. [d. at 208. For Oakley the consequence of a probation violation is imprison-
ment for eight years. [d. 
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
41. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 16. 
118 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:109 
Although this relationship is rarely mentioned in official expla-
nations of welfare policy, its centrality has always been obvious. In 
the United States, public regulation of this relationship generally 
has been reducible to a single basic proposition: the terms on which 
public assistance is provided to able-bodied adults or to their chil-
dren must always be less attractive or more onerous than the least 
generous terms on which wage employment is offered to these same 
able-bodied adults. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, in 
their ground-breaking study of the functions of public welfare, Reg-
ulating the Poor, have demonstrated the capacity of this principle, 
often called the "iron law of welfare," to explain the evolution of 
public welfare policy and law in England and America.42 They de-
scribe the "iron law's" operation as follows: 
Employers have always understood that by shielding working 
people from some of the hazards of the market, relief reduces the 
power of employers over workers. . .. [F]or just this reason, the 
very idea of social provision is defined as dangerously subversive 
of market ideology . . .. [E]mployers press to ... attach such 
punitive conditions for the receipt of aid that few people willingly 
apply for it. Such measures are intended to compel workers gen-
erally to sell labor on whatever the market offers.43 
Thus, they continue, relief is arranged 
in order to treat recipients in a manner that is so degrading as to 
instill in the laboring masses a fear of the fate that awaits them 
should they relax into beggary and pauperism. To demean and 
punish those who do not work is to exalt by contrast even the 
meanest labor at the meanest wages .... Degradation [takes the 
form of] [m]onitoring and excoriating the behavior of the 
poor. ... Dramatic allegations that recipients are slothful, shift-
less, promiscuous, criminal, and indifferent to the rules others 
value constitute rituals of public degradation. Conditioning ben-
efits on approved conduct is the traditional remedy.44 
Piven and Cloward emphasize that since the rise and rapid fall 
of the welfare rights movement of the 1960s, the focus of this 
"dramaturgy" of poor relief has been on welfare mothers. 
The degraded welfare mother was thus made to serve as a 
warning to all Americans who were working more and earning less, 
42. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: 
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1993). 
43. /d. at 345. 
44. Id. at 395-96. 
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if they were working at all. There is a fate worse, and a status 
lower, than hard and unrewarding work.45 
David Oakley's encounter with Wisconsin's enforcement of his 
legal obligation to support his children offers ample evidence that a 
similar ritualized degradation is at work to make an example of im-
poverished fathers who stray from their expected role. Justice Wil-
cox's emphasis on the adverse public fiscal impact of such parental 
shirking has already been noted.46 The concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Crooks underscores the law's obligation to "do what it can to 
minimize the effects of poverty on children,"47 even if extraordinary 
measures, including the suspension of their parents' constitutional 
rights, are required. 
More revealing, though, is the Justices' unanimous acknowl-
edgment that, regardless of his willingness to work, Oakley will 
never be able to support his children.48 In fact, he is not really ever 
expected to be able to support his children. The circuit judge who 
initially ordered Oakley not father any more children pointed first 
to Oakley's own admission that unless he wins the lottery, he will 
never be able to establish the financial ability to meet his obliga-
tions. The circuit judge then added the admission that 
[y]ou know and I know you're probably never going to make 75 
or 100 thousand dollar [sic] a year. You're going to struggle to 
make 25 or 30. And by the time you take care of your taxes and 
your social security, there isn't a whole lot to go around, and then 
you've got to ship it out to various children.49 
Justice Bradley's dissent seizes on this candid observation to 
buttress her conclusion that the condition imposed on Oakley by 
the majority is impossible to satisfy and therefore amounts to an 
unconstitutional assertion of unlimited·control over his right to pro-
create.50 The majority doesn't disagree, save obviously for the 
judgment of unconstitutionality, noting that its sanctIon is designed 
less to ensure the future support of Oakley's children than to pun-
ish his obviously insubordinate intentions: 
Oakley ... admits ... that he 'cannot and probably will never 
have the ability to properly support [his] children'. With this 
45. [d. at 396. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
46. Supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
47. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 215-16 (Wis. 2001) (emphasis added). 
48. Supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
49. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 217-18. 
50. [d. at 216-18 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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statement, Oakley attempt to confuse the financial ability to sup-
port his children fully with the intention of making any effort to 
do so. That is, Oakley violated [his support obligations] because 
he intentionally refused to pay any child support, not because he 
lacked the financial wherewithal to pay any child support.51 
That Oakley's past employment has translated into his meeting 
seventy percent of his support obligations until the single 120 day 
period for which he was charged and convicted is unavailing: "This 
case is not at all about a person's inability to pay child support; it is 
about the intentional refusal to pay support."52 
Still, given their acknowledgment that even if employed 
Oakley's "financial wherewithal" has been, is, and will be lacking, 
the majority must labor to explain how the record presented to 
them shows that his intentions alone merit withdrawal of his right 
to father additional children. This is their explanation, offered by 
Justice Wilcox: "Oakley had promised in the past to support his 
children, but those promises had failed to translate into the needed 
support. Moreover, ... Oakley had been employed and had no 
impediment preventing him from working."53 That's it. After the 
rhetoric is done, Oakley's real offense is quite simple. He has failed 
to support his children, which places them at risk of becoming pub-
lic charges. Further, he is able to work but, we are to assume be-
tween the lines, has repudiated his obligation to do so. 
The Oakley majority's evident lack of concern for the efficacy 
of their sanction in bringing about increased child support by 
Oakley and their emphasis instead on what they take to be 
Oakley's willful disregard of his obligations directly reflect two key 
tenets of the Elizabethan construction and condemnation of the 
"sturdy rogue" as a deviant social type. First, when a father's im-
poverishment is reflected in his failure to support his children, his 
actual financial circumstances, no matter how dire, are irrelevant. 
What matters is the father's willingness, or lack thereof, to work for 
any wage made available and to devote the wage he earns to child 
support, however inadequate. Child poverty is deemed to be a 
function of individual pathology, not social inadequacy. Second, 
the intended audience for the sanction visited on the sturdy rogue 
for his deviance is not the rogue himself, even if the sanction is 
framed in terms of reforming his character or rehabilitating him. 
51. Id. at 212 n.30 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. at 214 (Bablitch, J., concurring). 
53. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
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The rogue has already fallen so far that he is beyond redemption. 
Instead, the audience to his fate is the class of low wage-working 
men from which he has fallen by renouncing the role he is expected 
to fill. 
In turn, these men are to take the lessons of Piven and 
Cloward's "iron law of welfare" from the rogue's fall.54 First, re-
gardless of the meagerness of their wage or the onerousness of the 
terms on which it is provided, they at least enjoy the psychic com-
pensation owed those who stick to their station. They will not be 
described by a judge purporting to speak for us all as men "who 
ha[ve] shown [themselves] time and again to be totally and com-
pletely irresponsible ... [to live] only for [themselves] and the mo-
ment, with no regard to the consequences of [their] actions and 
taking no responsibility for them."55 If this security of social posi-
tion has no cash value, its contribution to self-respect may be, to 
quote the ubiquitous credit card commercial, priceless. Second, 
should these men be tempted to quit, drop out, hit the road, make a 
play for freedom, however ephemeral-in short, become an idle 
vagabond, there is a price and it is not small. Just look at David 
Oakley. To be sure, the state may have helped their mothers raise 
his children, perhaps better than he could have, at least in the mate-
rial sense. But, in return, he was criminally prosecuted and labeled 
by everyone, including even his judicial defenders, as a deadbeat, 
deprived, probably permanently, of the fundamental constitutional 
right of parenthood and stripped of the social respect due first class 
citizens and full members of the community. There is always, 
please recall, a fate worse than hard and unrewarding work. 
IV. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF OUR ELIZABETHAN HERITAGE 
If the Oakley case shows the durability and power of our Eliza-
bethan heritage in shaping a special law of poor families, the very 
venerability of this heritage suggests that it must play an important 
social role. Thus, to the extent that the prosecution of poor parents, 
mainly fathers, makes additional funds available to other poor par-
ents, mainly mothers, for the raising of their children, that result 
must be counted a positive good. If the image of the sturdy rogue 
cannot easily be depicted as filling a social role worth emUlating, 
that too is probably a good thing, even if the contrary imagery of 
much popular music reveals the enduring attraction of the freedom 
54. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
55. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 215 (Bablitch, J., concurring). 
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embodied by the idle vagabond as romantic outlaw.56 Nevertheless, 
there is a deeply reactionary side to our persistent Elizabethan ide-
ology. When the poverty of children is seen as the fault of their 
parents, our attention is diverted from seeing the well-being of chil-
dren as a social, rather than exclusively familial, responsibility. This 
may at least partly explain why the idea of a universal, non means-
tested family or children's allowance, ironically now a staple of 
British social policy, remains unthinkable in the United States. If, 
as many liberals profess, we actually believe that full-time work 
ought to provide a living wage, we must recognize that punishing 
those who refuse to work for less than such a wage seriously under-
mines the organizing power of the working poor. An alternative 
such as a negative income tax, by assuring a stigma-free minimum 
level of sustenance as an alternative to low wage work, would by 
itself require employers to abandon their most exploitative com-
pensation policies. The "iron law of welfare" may be universal but 
it need not be universally oppressive. 
To be sure, children's allowances and guaranteed incomes are 
expensive and, in these cynical times of purposeful massive deficits 
and global races to the bottom, they are far from politically realistic 
reforms. But our widely shared Elizabethan attitudes toward poor 
families, including, most especially, our image of the sturdy rogue 
as the male equivalent of President Reagan's infamous "welfare 
queen,"57 place the time when we might consider such reforms so 
far away as to be only barely visible. Meanwhile, as Professor ten-
Broek observed nearly forty years ago, in marking the statutory de-
mise in California of the punishment of vagrants for their mere 
vagrancy, 
[e lxit, thus, as a straightforward, unalloyed uncomplicated crimi-
nal character the sturdy rogue, the idle vagabond, the true va-
grant. Through the ages he had known the heavy hand of 
parliament and kings, the covetous grasp of feudal lords and agri-
cultural employers, the outrage of the righteous and ambitious, 
the undisguised hatred of overseers of the poor and the taxpayer, 
the moral opprobrium of the United States Supreme Court and 
the puritan, the oppression of discriminatory treatment in statute 
and constitution, the fear of the owner of property and the accu-
mulator of worldly goods, the steady, sometimes brutal pressure 
of the forces of stability, tranquility, and social order. Whether 
56. See, e.g., ED CRAY, RAMBLIN' MAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WOODY GUTH. 
RIE (2004). 
57. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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haughty, servile, or indifferent, he has been the victim of every 
sort of epithet, reviled by judges as a social parasite, and by 
Harvard historians as "no more than a festering part" of society. 
He leaves more quietly than he lived, shuffled offstage as in a 
mere recasting of small sections of a minor statute unnoticed by 
press and public-his wandering offstage as pointless, idle and 
without purpose, in the broader social sense, as his services on it. 
He still remains in the vicinage, however, to play bit parts, and 
lurk, prowl, and roam about in other statutory crimes.58 
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May David Oakley and the other sturdy rogues among us live 
to transcend this sour fate. 
58. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 204-05. 
